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Abstract
Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (PSF) primarily reflects on culture 
as a system of normative domains that are path-dependently configured. PSF elabo-
rates on the domains of myth/religion, language, and science, but misses a discus-
sion of the economy. By sketching a corresponding exposition, we contribute to the 
ongoing discussion of how economic science may investigate the world beyond util-
ity functions. Our argument proceeds along historical and comparative lines with a 
‘reciprocal comparison’ of the medieval economies of Europe and Japan. We thus 
approach the normative essence of economic thought and behaviour and test its 
variability in socio-cultural contexts diverging from ‘now’ and ‘here’. Our sketch 
of the economy as a symbolic form has important implications for the theoretical 
understanding of change in social systems. We argue that existing factors of change 
recognised in the economics discipline, such as fluctuations in supply and demand, 
and institutional innovation, critically require a superposition with patterns of cogni-
tion as they guide agents in their grasp of economic problems and, consequently, in 
their responses that shape material economies. We suggest that conceiving of the 
economy as a symbolic form makes these patterns of cognition accessible.
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1 Introduction
Ernst Cassirer, a disciple of the neo-Kantian school, is a heavyweight in philosophi-
cal discourse. With well over 50,000 citations, his works have been cited more often 
than those of famous economists such as Jan Tinbergen, Reinhard Selten, and Ver-
non Smith (1969, 1994, and 2002 Nobel Laureates). While the economics literature 
continues to show some traces of its origins in moral philosophy with a small but 
steady stream of references to philosophers, Cassirer’s work is almost entirely absent 
from it.
Cassirer’s magnum opus, his three-volume Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
(1923‒1929; henceforth PSF), regroups what may be regarded as a cultural philoso-
phy of language, mythical thought, and science. While the absence of a correspond-
ing treatise on ‘the economy as a symbolic form’ may explain the lack of references 
to PSF in the economics literature, it does not imply that his work is irrelevant for 
the discipline of economics. On the contrary, Klattenhoff’s recent suggestion that we 
should understand money as a symbol with important functions in Cassirer’s sense 
(Klattenhoff 2016, 2018) and Miklautz’s analysis of the sphere of commodities as a 
symbolic form (Miklautz 2005) illustrate the potential contribution of PSF to eco-
nomic thought.
With the growing recognition of economics as a cultural science (Throsby 2001; 
Dopfer 2011) and as a cultural “artefact” itself (Hartman 1977), a critical appraisal 
of PSF’s potential bearing on economics seems a very timely endeavour. Notably, 
the economics discipline has recently witnessed a strong surge in discussions around 
the insufficient recognition of how economic rationality and behaviour depend 
on cultural conditions. Adding to such variety ‘in space’ (i.e., between individual 
actors), a second stream of criticism toward received economic theory refers to its 
lack of reflection on change as ‘variety in time’. Mueller (2004) offers a concise 
overview of these two discussions.
While an “ultimate reduction of all cultural forms to the one form of logic seems 
to be implied by the concept of philosophy itself” (Cassirer 1923–1929[1953–1957]: 
I,84),1 Cassirer eschews any reductionist reading of that principle. On the contrary, 
he sets out to build a theory of culture as a system of mutually irreducible, com-
plementary domains of meaning (starting with language, myth, and science in the 
three volumes of his magnum opus). As evident from his writings on technology or 
law, and his last systematic exposition, the Essay on Man, Cassirer came to think of 
culture as an open, evolving system of such domains. We want to argue in this paper 
that economy is fully deserving of a place in this system.2
1 The German original reads: “Und in der Tat scheint diese letzte Zentrierung aller geistigen Formen 
in dereinen logischen Form durch den Begriff der Philosophie selbst […] notwendig gefordert zu sein.” 
English translation as of 1953 Yale University press edition.
2 In his earlier attempts at systematization, Cassirer assumes a link in the evolution of symbolic forms 
from myth, dominated by the symbolic function of expression, through language, moving to the higher 
level of representation, and finally, to science, which makes full use of the highest function of “pure 
meaning”, that is, meaning purely constituted by internal semantic relations (Cassirer 1923–29: II). This 
would mean that the system of symbolic forms would be completed with the emergence of modern sci-
ence. However, in his later works on technology, law, and art, he opens up the idea of symbolic forms 
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Cassirer’s theory builds on the key observation that the human grasp of reality is 
fundamentally mediated through symbols. This implies a mutual existential depend-
ency of the universal and the particular (Cassirer 1923–1929[1953–1957]: I, 86).3 A 
symbol in the strict sense is a material entity that is produced to “stand in” for some-
thing else (like a red traffic light for the order “stop and wait”). It is dependent on the 
material conditions of production (no traffic lights without electricity and individual 
motorized transport), and on socially shared rules of articulation and application 
(colour coding, traffic regulations). While the said rules allow one symbol to stand 
in for a manifold of objects, or thoughts, or modes of behaviour, they are bound to 
a specific normative domain. In the words of Luft, they belong to distinct “cultural 
spaces of meaning” (Luft 2004). And they develop and change over time, not least 
due to changes in technology and other socio-cultural conditions.
The context dependence of symbolic representation implies a twofold differ-
entiation, in normative domains, and in path-dependently evolved configurations 
(Steineck 2014: 5, Steineck 2020). In other words, while each instantiation of a nor-
mative domain/symbolic form represents a fundamental normative orientation, its 
actual formation is shaped by the particular social and historical context. Accord-
ingly, it has to negotiate general rules of society that define the “opportunity space” 
of “permissible operations” (Dopfer and Potts 2008: 9) for each domain.4 At the 
same time, each symbolic articulation (scientific paper, work of art, and religious 
ritual) has to operate with a transmitted repertoire and the available sign systems to 
be understandable. This implies that innovation is possible, but only within specific 
boundaries.5
3 This also resolves the problem of the distinction between intelligible and sensible worlds encountered 
in idealism (Cassirer 1923: I,21).
4 Such space may be markedly different, for example, for art in a state defining itself by religion, such as 
seventeenth-century Zurich or present-day Iran, as opposed to secular republics such as classical Athens 
or contemporary Japan.
5 E.g., the development of mathematics in ancient Rome being hampered by the limitations of the avail-
able sign system. Cassirer understands the historical development of each symbolic form as an evolu-
tion starting with initial formations dominated by expressive/mimetic symbolisation, which has no clear 
distinction between the sign and its referent. The next stage is governed by representative symbols and 
analogisms, with symbols standing in for experiential phenomena. Finally, each symbolic form arrives 
at a stage where its signs are purely defined by their internal relations, which Cassirer equates with “the 
final, properly symbolic mode of conceptualization” (“die endgültige, die eigentlich-symbolische Form 
der Begriffsbildung”, Cassirer 1923–1929:  III 530). This paradigm was developed through Cassirer ‘s 
extensive studies in the history of the natural sciences, and it identifies each historical formation with a 
stage in the development of the symbolic form itself. One of us has proposed a less monolithic view of 
the history of symbolic forms, which differentiates more clearly between the general symbolic form and 
its instantiations in various historic formations, and comprises a matrix of formative factors that helps to 
to the realm of the practical and the aesthetic (Cassirer 1985; 2005; 2004; 1979: 145–215). In his Essay 
on Man, he suggests that the symbolic forms are irreducible and complementary to each other (Cassirer 
1992: 181, 244). At the same time, he retains the evolutionary scheme as a paradigm of development for 
each symbolic form: each form develops from a mythical state, where it is dominated by the function 
of expression, through one dominated by representation before finally developing its own semantics of 
“pure meaning”. As one of us has argued theoretically and demonstrated for the symbolic form of myth, 
this evolutionary paradigm is deeply problematic (Steineck 2014: 59–67, 130–35; 2017); we therefore 
retain only the idea of the complementarity of symbolic forms.
Footnote 2 (continued)
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Our application of PSF to the economic sphere takes the form of an initial explo-
ration. A full systematic study, which would have to present a wealth of source 
materials reflecting the self-understanding of economic agents through global his-
tory is obviously beyond the scope of this paper.6 In selecting our material, we hold 
to the general idea of gaining epistemological benefit from a ‘reciprocal comparison’ 
(Pomeranz 2000) across time and space, in this case an under-explored geographical 
and historical juxtaposition that contrasts England to Japan during the latter coun-
try’s later medieval period (1185 to 1600). This choice of case study also highlights 
how the “model of economic rationality” found in orthodox economics “does a very 
poor job of predicting human behaviours” (Quinn 2016) outside a narrowly defined 
subject matter. As our analysis will show both the internal historic formation of 
the economic sphere, and its entanglement with other symbolic forms—here, most 
importantly the religious and the economic, are instrumental for understanding vari-
ation in configurations of the economy across time and space.
This insight has several implications. First, for economic theorizing, it suggests 
the need to allow for variation in the reasoning of agents. This is significant, because 
it downgrades the received assumptions of universal economic rationality to the 
status of a special case, applying at best to economies dominated by modern capi-
talist relations of production. For the great many other particular cases, economic 
theorizing will need to rely on specific forms of rationality. Second, it implies that 
economic methodology needs to open further toward multidisciplinary approaches. 
And third, it necessitates more complex empirical enquires for its call to add and 
integrate the study of reason to that of economic outcomes.
We structure this article as follows. Section  2 introduces the core elements of 
Cassirer’s PSF. Section  3 develops a sketch of the economy as a symbolic form. 
Section 4 compares the medieval economies of Japan and England to illustrate how 
symbolic representation informs economic outcomes. Section 5 reflects on theoreti-
cal implications, methodological consequences, and empirical practice. Section  6 
concludes.
2  The theory of symbolic forms
The Theory of Symbolic Forms can be described as a “systems theory of cognitive 
patterns” (Kreis 2010:11), in which patterns are understood as guiding the behav-
iour of agents including their production of cultural objects. In his work on PSF, a 
general discontent with the limitations of contemporary epistemology seems to have 
strongly contributed to Cassirer’s motivation. At the time, epistemology was focused 
almost exclusively on the natural sciences, which—in his view—implied that it 
Footnote 5 (continued)
operationalize the concept of symbolic form for historical and empirical cultural analysis. See (Raji C. 
Steineck 2020).
6 This is the method used by Cassirer himself, at least in his studies on the symbolic forms of language 
and science (vols. 2 and 3 of the PSF).
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could not “provide an adequate methodological basis for the cultural sciences” (Cas-
sirer 1923–1929[1953–1957]: I 69). Cassirer’s thought presupposes the accomplish-
ments of critical idealism: “The road does not lead solely from ‘data’ to ‘laws’ and 
from laws back to ‘axioms’ and ‘principles’: the axioms and principles themselves, 
which at a certain stage of knowledge represent the ultimate and most complete 
solution, must at a later stage become once more a problem.” (Cassirer 1923[1953]: 
I 74). Clearly, this notion foreshadows the problematisation of orthodox economic 
principles in recent years, by which “the rigid concept of being seems to be thrown 
into flux” (ibid.). If we accept this evolutionary principle, “the fundamental con-
cepts of each science […] are regarded no longer as passive images of something 
given, but as symbols created by the intellect itself” (ibid.:75). Any appreciation of 
the ‘facts’, or of ‘data’, therefore, necessarily needs to take into consideration the 
theories and perceptions that motivated the quest for them (Cassirer 1992: 56–62, 
von Glasersfeld 1989).
Importantly, Cassirer holds that a “concept of culture cannot be detached from 
the fundamental forms and directions of human activity: here ‘being’ can be appre-
hended only in ‘action.’” (Cassirer 1923[1953]: I 80). PSF thus proposes that all 
existence has both physical and cognitive properties (Kreis 2010: 16). Symbols in 
Cassirer’s understanding result from the total of all meaningful operations (ibid.). 
Where operations are not random, but build on rules (condition-action statements), 
their execution enables a function to be served, rendering the corresponding opera-
tions meaningful.
As the attribution of meaning requires an act of an individual agent, conceiving 
the arts, religion, the sciences, and significantly, the economy in terms of a sym-
bolic form retains a key element of methodological individualism. However, indi-
viduals perceive, experience, and understand the world, and themselves, by way of 
engagement with symbolic forms—Luft’s “cultural spaces of meaning”—and these 
are, in essence, socially constituted. What is considered valid, be it aesthetically, 
technologically, or economically, is thus conceived to be so not only for the indi-
vidual, but for the entire population of agents sharing the relevant symbolic form. 
Therefore, “methodological individualism” in Cassirer’s PSF does not imply “social 
atomism”.7
Finally, as a concretisation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, PSF embraces what 
contemporary scholarship would call ‘historicity’8 and—as a corollary—‘localism’ 
(see, e.g., Katzner 2002; Blind 2017:163). This is manifest in Cassirer’s recognition 
that language, and indeed, all symbolic cultural systems, are dependent on space and 
time (Kreis 2010: 26)—and that, therefore, the “form” that is the object proper of 
philosophical analysis “can be found only through immersion in the empirical mate-
rial, but this is accessible to us […] only in a historical form” (Cassirer et al. 1998: 
7 See Cassirer’s discussion of “Basis Phenomena”, in (Cassirer 1998: 136–43, 153–66).
8 ‘Historicity’ here refers to the position that all instantiations of symbolic forms comprise path-
dependently developed sign systems, media formats, social institutions, and knowledge repertoires, and 
are therefore historically specific. Conversely, no single instantiation represents the ‘pure’ or ‘universal’ 
symbolic form.
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165). Building on this fundamental insight, we can say that we never encounter a 
symbolic form ‘as such’, but only one of its historically and locally specific forma-
tions.9 Our later sketch, thus, may be labelled ‘history-friendly’.
Central to maintaining our later argument (Sect.  3) in line with Cassirer’s 
spirit is the distinction of worldviews and their many particular functions, namely 
to deliver “purposeful outcomes” as in von Bertalanffy’s understanding (Ber-
talanffy  1950: 159). This stems from the very  basis of PSF: no object allows for 
direct appreciation, but critically depends on the relevant "formal context" (Cassirer 
1923‒1929[1953‒57]: I 95). That context, in turn, is provided by the symbolic rep-
resentation that channels all cognitive access (Steineck 2014: 24). This dichotomy 
equally applies to the distinction between economic reasoning (based on particular 
worldviews), and economic outcomes (originating from agents assuming functions).
The link between operations and their cognitive foundations is function. As 
all thought implies a function (Kreis 2010: 60), and as thought becomes manifest 
through language, all terms are associated with a function. A function, in turn, 
denotes the unifying aspect in recurring actions, and may thus be coded as a con-
dition‒action statement. In Cassirer, functions constitute a relational association 
between entities—both physical and cognitive (Cassirer 1990: 410–11). The time- 
and space-dependent totality of symbol systems are used for:
(i) The expression of functions and the operations required to execute them,
(ii) Of objects created thereby,
(iii) The social relations between agents involved.
This constitutes what we propose to call the ‘symbolic configuration’. As such it 
specifies the particular historic formations of a symbolic form.
This brings us directly to the thorny issue of delineating what it is precisely that 
defines the artefacts, rules, ideas, lifeworlds, and social spheres pertaining to a spe-
cific symbolic form. Cassirer has shed away from giving an outright definition of 
his key term, but Kreis (2010: 449) has provided a list of four defining elements of a 
symbolic form:
1 A general normative concept embracing the ensemble of rules informing the 
formation of domain-specific objects.
2 A lifeworld resulting from the exchange of particular expressions.
3 A general concept representing the totality of ideas that can be expressed in terms 
of (1).
4 A general concept representing specific social spheres of action, namely
5 The set of social groups following the rules of (1),
6 The set of social practices linked to the conduct of (1).
9 Methodologically, as a slow-moving variable, a historical/local formation may be interpolated from 
the encounter with numerous interrelated instantiations. For instance, in the case of science, laboratories, 
experiments, articles in scientific journals, textbook chapters, course curricula, reports in popular media, 
and so forth, can serve this purpose.
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As a “cultural space of meaning” (Luft 2004), a ‘symbolic form’ thus stands for 
the ensemble of rules (1) that guide the behaviour (also 1), imagination, and reason-
ing (3) of agents into functions. As agents create and exchange artefacts and ideas 
resulting from this, they build a specific lifeworld (2) with their particular social 
groups (4a) and practices (4b). Notably, (4a) reflects a theoretical reception of Max 
Weber’s understanding of social groups as being critical in creating and maintaining 
distinctive intellectual lifeworlds (Bellah 1999: 279).
3  The economy as a symbolic form
While even proponents of (early) neo-classical economics such as Carl Menger are 
known to have admitted that (pecuniary) self-interest is “only one of a number of 
human motives” (Yagi 1993: 720), a vast majority of research in economics contin-
ues to rely on assuming exactly such universal economic rationality, particularly so 
for empirical works. Assessing economic outcomes based on these grounds might 
still be sufficiently safe for the study of modern capitalist economies. However, it 
can lead to flawed conclusions (at worst), or fail to produce useful insights (at best) 
outside of this ‘standard environment’. The case study presented in the subsequent 
section serves to illustrate why it is necessary to re-consider the rationality underly-
ing economic operations in different socio-economic systems.
Arguably, the assumption of a universal, trans-temporal economic rationality is 
not a conscious choice for most scholars. It has developed into a given presupposi-
tion, implicit not only in most empirical studies, but even so in theoretical works. 
For instance, if we take Robbins’ classic definition of economics as the study of 
“human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” (Robbins 1932: 15), there is no direct mention of the assumption. 
While Robbins defies the notion of economists assuming the sole pursuit of (pecu-
niary) self-interest as a “foolish and exasperating accusation “(1932: 97), he still 
admits that the assumption is “convenient” (ibid p. 98).
We hold that the analysis of most configurations of the economic realm requires 
to abandon exactly this convenience. With Klattenhoff (2018), we believe that eco-
nomic analysis needs to embrace the cognitive foundation that turns behaviour into 
functional operations, as well as the cultural objects (physical and intangible alike) 
created and sustained through such operations (e.g., goods, markets, and businesses). 
This promises to enlarge epistemological potential, particularly when researching 
economies not governed by modern capitalist relations of production.
Partially coinciding with criticism from outside the discipline (e.g., Gudeman 
1986), economics is increasingly recognised as a cultural science (Stanfield 1995; 
Throsby 2001; Dopfer 2011). However, the theoretical basis for this reasoning 
remains fragmentary. Here, the PSF may help to fill that particular gap. In Cassirer’s 
own words, PSF provides a “morphology of the human spirit”, which is required “to 
arrive at a clearer and more reliable methodological approach to the individual cul-
tural sciences” (1923–1929[1953–1957]: I 69).
We further posit that the domain of the economic fulfills all the definitional cri-
teria of a symbolic form listed in Sect. 2 and should be seen as an important part of 
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the morphology of human culture. Conversely, taking full account of these criteria 
will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the scope of economic prob-
lems and phenomena. Pertaining to element 1 (“a general concept representing the 
rules and operations leading to the formation of domain-specific objects”), we hold 
that the economy may be defined as the purpose of provisioning goods and prevent-
ing economic harm (see discussion below); this purpose informs the ensemble of 
economic rules and the ensuing totality of economic operations, including acts of 
cognition.10 Equally, we see 2 (a “lifeworld”) and 3 (a “sphere of ideas”) as satisfied, 
because the economy not only represents a domain of interaction frequently con-
trasted to others (such as religion or art), but also implies a specific worldview, and 
a space of domain-specific imagination (from entrepreneurial ideas to social wel-
fare policies). Importantly, 4a (“the set of social groups following the rules of 1”) 
is not explicitly recognised in much of received contemporary economic thought. 
The importance of this element, however, has been prominently stressed in more 
recent work exploring sub-populations of agents as ‘carriers’ of rules both empiri-
cally (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and Basurto 2011), and theoretically (e.g., Dopfer 
and Potts 2008). In turn, 4b (“the set of social practices linked to the conduct of 1”) 
conforms strongly to received notions, with production, exchange, and consumption 
(compare Veblen 1899) as the most pertinent practices.
Unlike our defining of the economy as a symbolic form, Robbins’ received for-
mula obviously attempts to define the science of economics, and not the sphere of 
the economy as such. One might infer that, to Robbins and those that have followed 
him, the defining characteristic of the economic sphere is the “relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”. In our view, this is helpful in 
locating the economic in the sphere of the practical (the ‘moral sciences’, as older 
tradition had it). However, from the perspective of the PSF, Robbins’ definition 
leads to a view of the economy that includes too much on one hand, and not enough 
on the other.
First, it seems overly broad to define all behaviour pertaining to ends and scarce 
means with alternative uses as economic, if one accounts with PSF for the plural-
ity of co-existing symbolic forms. For instance, wine and other forms of fermented 
drinks may be used in religious rituals to drink, to sprinkle, or to be left to evaporate 
(to be drunk by the gods, so to speak). It is scarce (probably), and it has alterna-
tive uses (surely). However, the choice of ritual and concomitant behaviour is not an 
economic one; it is a religious one. To broaden the field of economics to all relation-
ships between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses is to lose sight of 
what is specifically economic.11
10 This builds directly on Cassirer’s understanding whereby “every ‘reproduction’ of a content embodies 
a new level of ‘reflection.’” (Cassirer 1923–1929[1953–1957]: I 90).
11 To give another example: Did Beethoven make an economic choice when he decided to repeat part 
of the main theme in the coda to the first movement of his ‘Pastoral’ sonata? Paper was scarce and had 
alternative uses; the listener’s attention is equally scarce and has alternative uses. Still, one may argue 
that the decision is primarily a consequence of a compositional choice earlier in the movement, designed 
to maintain the overall balance: it is an aesthetic choice, not an economic one.
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Second, the link to scarcity is culturally and historically specific; it has been char-
acterised as “peculiarly appropriate to [modern] market economies” (Gowdy and 
Sahlins 1998: 6). It seems appropriate, therefore, neither to contemporary economies 
of abundance, nor to economies moderated by the presence of other symbolic forms. 
For instance, superposition with the religious may motivate the use of ‘sufficiency’ 
over ‘efficiency’ in an economy where eventual surpluses are meant to remain for 
the gods, or the dead (compare the evidence on offerings following surplus condi-
tions in the neolithic revolution in Fuller and Grandjean 2001).
Taking recourse to pre-marginalist theory may direct us towards a broader, but 
still sufficiently specific concept of the economy. In terms of the above definition 
of symbolic forms, we can appreciate that earlier theories are centred on the ‘life-
world’ dimension of the economy (and less, as in much of current economics, on the 
‘behavioural’ dimension). For instance, in Say, we find the notion that “l’économie 
politique […] montre comment se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les rich-
esses qui satisfont aux besoins des sociétés” (Say 1803: I; emphasis added). Simi-
larly, Adam Smith defined the central economic objective as providing “a plenti-
ful revenue or subsistence” (Smith 1776: 428). Both views echo the central idea of 
the Pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomia, namely that economics is about providing or 
possessing “the means to a happy life” (book 1.1, cf. Aristotle and Forster 1920). 
The Oeconomia also identifies four fundamental economic abilities: the acquisi-
tion, preservation, management, and proper use of wealth (ibid., book 1.6). Look-
ing beyond Europe, we find that the Indian political treatise Arthashastra (second 
to third century CE) gives a metonymical definition of the economy (skt. varta) by 
way of “agriculture, animal husbandry, and commerce” (Kauṭilya and Meyer 1977: 
4). Its subsequent material discussion of various spheres of production (basic and 
luxury goods alike) as well as logistics (roads and ships) (Kauṭilya and Meyer 1977: 
116–225) clearly hints at ways to arrive at greater societal well-being.
Synthesising these ideas spanning several epochs and continents, we can now fur-
ther elaborate on our earlier definition of the function of an economy as “the provi-
sion of goods and, conversely, the prevention of economic harm”. A ‘good’ here 
means a transitive thing (a material object, a symbol, an action, a quality, which 
may be collectively perceived, and which can be acquired and transferred between 
agents) that may serve as a means to sustain and further human life and well-being. 
Not everything that is conducive to human well-being is therefore a ‘good’ in this 
particular, economic sense; friendship, for example, is not transferable, and there-
fore not an economic good. ‘Economic harm’ is here understood as an object that 
is detrimental to human life and well-being; likewise, not everything that is detri-
mental to human life implies damage in this economic sense: the loss of a loved one, 
for example, is usually perceived as harmful, but it may or may not imply economic 
damage. ‘Provision’ in the economic sense means to have something at one’s dis-
posal. As Amartya Sen has famously argued, it is not sufficient that a good (such as 
food) is generally available, but one has to have access to it. Only where a good is 
physically accessible, and those who need it are also entitled to use it, can it serve its 
economic function of sustaining human life (Sen 1981).
What we have gained from these brief reflections is, therefore, first, a necessary 
specification—an economic system is to provide goods and to prevent economic 
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harm. Mirrored against the definition of a symbolic form given in Sect.  2, this 
implies that the symbolic form of the economy provides the ensemble of rules (defi-
nition element 1) that enable functions to deliver the purposes of provisioning goods 
and preventing economic harm. As agents conduct corresponding operations in 
exchange with each other, they co-create their proper economic lifeworld (element 
2) and ways of reasoning (element 3). A specific social process-structure emerges, in 
which social practices (element 4a) contribute the process part to the structural ele-
ments given by social groups (element 4b).
Second, we can rest assured that broadening the subject matter of economics by 
defining it as a symbolic form will facilitate the synthesising of the received wisdom 
of various regions and ages. In conceptualising the economy as a symbolic form, we 
are neither bound to exclusively focus on the riches that satisfy the needs of soci-
eties, nor on behaviour related to scarce means with alternative uses. Instead, we 
can include both, and more, for example the study of economic rules, theories, or 
social institutions and their interactions with each other and with the former. Fur-
thermore, we can understand that economics cannot rely on a universal theory of 
human behaviour, or society, or culture, but is domain-specific, which makes the 
relation between the economic realm and other cultural domains a necessary, and 
legitimate, field of inquiry and reflection.
Comparing configurations of the economy as they differ in space and time is the 
promise offered by applying PSF to the economic sphere. At the same time, and 
crucially, a classification system may help to enable this bold endeavour. Cassirer’s 
own work is not much help in this regard, as he did not analyse the economy as 
a symbolic form, and, in spite of his general ideas on the historicity of symbolic 
forms, neither did he develop a terminology nor a methodology for analysing his-
toric formations of symbolic forms. To come up with a tentative analytical system, 
a reflection on the systemic aspects of ‘provision with goods’ may serve to identify 
the basic vectors for building a matrix of variants.12
In order for goods to serve as provisions for someone, they need to exist; the first 
vector is therefore that of production (in the broad sense of bringing a good into 
existence). Second, goods have to be available for use; that is, they need to be pre-
sent at the temporal-spatial location where they can fulfill their function of further-
ing the life of an individual or a collective: this corresponds to the vector of physical 
appropriation. Third, they need to be ‘socially available’; that is, their association 
with an individual or collective needs to be socially valid: the vector of social recog-
nition, entitlement, or ownership rights; and in a wider sense, the vector of economic 
social relations. A fourth dimension is ‘economic means’—operations, objects, and 
institutions specifically designed for the sake of the economic sphere, to facilitate 
the provision, circulation, and socially accepted acquisition or transfer of goods: the 
vector of economic media, such as money, deeds, or patents.
A first rough typology of ‘economies’ (configurations of the symbolic form 
of the economy) may then be built by characterising them through the relative 
12 The following systematisation is inspired by Johannes Heinrich’s “periodic table of actions” (Hein-
richs 2007), but is not confined to it.
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weight of these one vectors (which does not mean that the others are excluded, but 
simply that they play a minor part): subsistence economies, for example, are domi-
nated by production. The economies of hunter and gatherer societies, or those of 
predatory collectives such as pirates, are built on appropriation. Family, clan, or 
feudal economies are dominated by the vector of social entitlements, and formerly 
planned economies may equally see the substantial weight in this vector (Ledeneva 
1998; Butler and Purchase 2004). Most market economies are dominated by the vec-
tor of economic media, but arguably to varying degrees. Depending on the dominant 
vector, particular economic phenomena may or may not arise. For instance, the dis-
tribution of goods (in terms of logistics) may be observed in economies dominated 
by the second, third, and fourth vectors (transport of ‘loot’ in the second, in-kind 
tithes in the third, and merchandise in the fourth). The exchange of goods for money, 
i.e., trade, including multi-stage variants, is necessarily only to be observed in suf-
ficiently monetised economies. Production and appropriation economies have rela-
tively little need for specific symbolic interaction; in contrast, economies dominated 
by entitlements or media require elaborate communication, and will exhibit a more 
differentiated configuration of economic symbols, concepts and institutions/agent 
groups (compare definitional criteria 2, 3, 4; in Sect. 2).
Evidently, ‘economic rationality’ can be very different in each of these archetypi-
cal configurations. Even more so, we expect to find substantial variations in ‘eco-
nomic reasoning’ in empirical configurations as they not only depend on the weight-
ing of these vectors, but also on time- and space-dependent inter-relationships with 
other symbolic forms. Put simply, economic agents will behave differently depend-
ing on the type of economy they are operating in. From this, we also understand 
that received homo oeconomicus represents but an abstraction of a time- and space-
specific configuration of economic reasoning. Reflecting on our earlier definition of 
a symbolic form as (1) comprising the ensemble of rules guiding the behaviour and 
reasoning of agents, and (2) the following of rules as enabling operations to effect 
economically meaningful functions, we hold that this may lead us to a terminology 
liberated from the limitations imposed on the received understanding of economic 
rationality.
4  How conceiving the economy as a symbolic form helps to make 
sense of differing outcomes in economic configurations: 
a comparative case study
In presenting our case study, we start by broadly following a received approach 
that relies on a resource-based analytical view of economic outcomes as observed 
for our objects of study, the medieval economies of England and Japan. This is 
to showcase how the resource-based approach—mere representation in Cassirer’s 
functional hierarchy—falls short of producing meaningful explanation for the 
difference in outcomes observed for this pair of temporally and spatially distant 
economic formations. As we shall see, however, widening the perspective to sys-
tematically include the particular characteristics of the corresponding configu-
rations of the economy as a symbolic form opens new routes to describing and 
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explaining commonalities and differences between them. From the perspective of 
the PSF, this implies an attempt to reconstruct from historical sources and data 
the meaning, that is, the patterns of cognition that were guiding the behaviour of 
agents in these economies. 
In terms of economic activity and output, the medieval societies of England and 
Japan were both strongly dominated by agricultural production. While neither was a 
subsistence economy, surplus available to extraction remained not only at low levels, 
but necessitated precautions against recurring years of negative primary surplus. For 
Japan, Totman calculates average surplus (i.e., share of the secondary and tertiary 
sectors) as around 7% for the Nara period (eighth century CE), but argues that new 
seeds and agricultural technologies boosted this figure from the tenth and eleventh 
centuries onwards, leading to substantial population growth and the development of 
artisan manufacture and trade (Totman 2000). Still, there was a major famine every 
7.4 years between 1280 and 1450, and every 5.4 years between 1450 and 1600 (Far-
ris 2006: 174), implying that near-subsistence conditions remained a reality for a 
major share of the populace.
The situation was similar in England. McCloskey and Nash (1984) report that 
in the late medieval period hardly any storage of grain took place, and that almost 
every harvest was preceded by famine. More recent scholarship, however, tends to 
question these claims, providing proof of substantial stockpiling which effectively 
evened out grain supply over the course of the year (Clark 2015). Even more disrup-
tive than famine were the recurring pandemic episodes that struck Europe from the 
late thirteenth century. For instance, on the British Isles, plague led to a population 
decline of more than 55% between 1270 and 1450 (Broadberry et  al. 2015: 179). 
While it implied a temporal increase in per-capita GDP, the relatively higher death 
toll in urban settlements disadvantaged the secondary and tertiary sectors. Eventu-
ally, and with the exception of a few regions such as the Netherlands and parts of 
Italy from the late fourteenth century, “it was only after 1870 that labor income rose 
decisively above medieval levels” in Europe (Allen 2001: 445).
Abstracting from differences in climate, both medieval economies alike were thus 
generally struggling with challenges brought about by nature, including systemic 
phenomena (seasonality), and idiosyncratic events (droughts, floods, etc.). Counter-
strategies were similar and chiefly included diversification of crops (to counter the 
former), and stockpiling (to counter the latter). Some recent empirical works allow 
for a direct comparison of sectoral structures in Japan (Bassino et al. 2015) and Eng-
land (Broadberry et al. 2011; 2015), because these studies build on a common meth-
odology. Fortunately, the data fully span our investigation period, namely from the 
thirteenth century to about 1600. The direct comparison shown in Fig. 1 reveals a 
substantial difference.
As can be inferred from Fig. 1, the share of the secondary and the tertiary sec-
tors is very different in the two economies. Even if neglecting the 1450 estimate for 
England—where the shrinking of the secondary and tertiary sectors was due to the 
Black Death pandemic—the tertiary sector of England’s economy was much less 
important than in Japan and vice versa. Beyond this kind of population-based influ-
ences, however, reasoning with the resource-base (with its underlying assumption of 
uniform economic rationality) does not promise much epistemological gain.
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Here, we apply the understanding of the economy as a symbolic form. In a first 
step, we attempt to establish to what extent the four vectors introduced in Sect. 3 
have been informing the reasoning of economic agents. The first point to note 
here is that these medieval economies were not dominated by the vector of pro-
duction alone, even if near-subsistence conditions were frequently endemic. Nei-
ther were these economies dominated by the vector of appropriation. In medieval 
Europe, economic systems predominantly built on appropriation were limited in 
scope and/or time; they included Viking pirate collectives (eighth-to-eleventh 
centuries), or the Victual Brothers during the late fourteenth century. Similarly, 
while criminal retainers enjoying the patronage of the nobility were reportedly 
not uncommon (Coyle 2005), they did not become the dominant vector for any 
sustained period. For Japan, the late Middle Ages are also known as the "Age 
of Warring States" (1467‒1600), which may suggest a sustained dominance by 
predatory collectives. However, property rights were effectively enforced by non-
governmental institutions, such as Buddhist temples and monasteries, adding a 
first hint to the more substantial share of the tertiary sector in Japan (Adolphson 
and Ramseyer 2009).
The dominant vector for much of the medieval period in England, continental 
Europe, and Japan alike was social entitlement. The economic system in Japan fea-
tured feudalistic structures with a vassal/fiefdom organization quite like the manorial 
system in England. While this comparison has been criticised for a lack of reflec-
tion and differentiation (Yasuda 1965: 18), it is safe to argue that there was a strong 
resemblance between the key functions of the two configurations. Both were initially 
cash-free systems in which central authorities bestowed fiefdoms on regional rulers, 
with a multi-level redistribution of land-to-local tenants. In exchange for the right 
to cultivate these lands, regional rulers organized military units, returned a fraction 
of crops, and provided corvée labor. Accordingly, a complex system of symbolic 
exchange developed to establish and maintain the social bonds that were the ulti-
mate basis of entitlements to resources.
Fig. 1  Sectoral composition of the British and Japanese medieval economies. Calculated from Table 6 
in Bassino, Broadberry et  al. 2015, p.30 for Japan; Broadberry et  al. 2015, p.179–81, and Broadberry 
Campbell et  al. 2011, p.35, Table  9 for England. The estimates of the secondary and tertiary sectors 
in these studies build on population density and urbanization rates. It may thus still underestimate the 
weight of the tertiary sector for Japan, where local administrators (Hyakusho) affected important mana-
gerial services for the organization of production and trade
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Thus, our comparison finds a considerable resemblance between the two econo-
mies in terms of the weight attached to the four vectors. Yet, in a second step, we 
now look into differences between the rule systems in place for guiding the opera-
tions of agents. In doing so, we separately consider the three sectors of our econo-
mies under scrutiny at the three points in time given in Fig. 1. One might argue that 
such analysis simply corresponds to investigating  institutional arrangements, but 
such view would start from structures, and not from the reasoning of agents. As we 
have argued in Sect. 3, such inferring of the reasoning of agents is crucially required 
to understand what rules apply to the allocation and enforcement of entitlements 
(owing to the third vector being dominant), and to configurations relating to expres-
sion, imagination, and social agency (Sect. 2, criteria 2, 3, 4).
As a broad but useful generalisation, during the periods governed by the vector 
of entitlements, the major governing mechanisms in England were explicitly coded 
in law (e.g., tax matters), whereas in Japan, many of these mechanisms were based 
on the social/political relations that gave rise to negotiations (e.g., as manifest in 
the various symbolic exchanges between tenants and local rulers). This created a 
predominance of legal obligations in England, and of social/political obligations in 
Japan (Haley 2010).13 The difference in practical importance, however, was bound 
to have a bearing on economic outcomes. In a setting that is based predominantly on 
personal relations, a relatively larger number of intermediaries involved in the bro-
kering and maintenance of these relations were needed in Japan.
This helps to develop a working hypothesis explaining the relative dominance of 
the tertiary over the secondary sector during the first part of the period analyzed 
here. In 1270, the first point in time for which Fig. 1 provides an estimate of the sec-
toral composition of the economy, remnants of the Chinese-inspired ritsuryô gov-
ernance system14 still required a substantial number of agents to be involved in the 
management of social entitlements in Japan. In contrast, in England, centuries of—
albeit meandering—developments following the first unified law code (the ninth-
century Doom Book of Alfred the Great) had contributed to an institutionalisation of 
the management of entitlements; hence, a lesser share of agents can be assumed to 
have been involved.
In turn, by 1450 (the second point in time documented in Fig. 1), we see that the 
vector of economic media (vulgo: money) had come to dominate substantial parts 
of the economy. By 1600 (the third point of time in Fig. 1), the two systems had 
been completely transformed into monetised economies. This view stands in con-
trast to some earlier sources holding that monetisation was not deeply embedded in 
medieval Japan. Yet, a very different picture emerges from recent scholarship docu-
menting that a majority of transactions were actually settled in cash already by the 
13 This does not imply that social relations were irrelevant in England—consider, for example, the 
behavioural rules implicit in the early medieval myth surrounding Beowulf (The prince who in his youth 
gave presents, to foster relationships that would support his later rule). Nor was the law absent from eco-
nomic life in Japan, as we can see from the Kamakura Shogunate’s attempt to regulate relations between 
landowners and tenants through the Goseibai shikimoku of 1232.
14 Japanese rulers tried to replicate the Chinese governance system around the turn of the seventh/eighth 
century, including a criminal code, and—more importantly—an administrative code.
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thirteenth century (Segal 2011: 59). This again corresponds to the development in 
Europe where “money supply expanded dramatically” from the later twelfth century 
(Naismith 2014: 4).
In contrast to the European experience, however, the introduction of money in the 
Japanese Middle Ages did not result from minting by domestic authorities, but arose 
predominantly from the proceeds of exports to China (Sakurai 2008). As the import 
of coins did not fluctuate strongly, money supply eventually increased just margin-
ally below the combined pace of economic growth and expanding monetisation. The 
result of this was a mildly deflationary environment with relatively little volatility 
(Yokoyama 2011; Domoto 2016), forming a stark contrast to inflation-ridden medi-
eval Europe (Hutton 2016). It remains an open research question whether this phe-
nomenon was simply accidental, or whether there was a conscious policy choice in 
favour of price stability. Either way, even within economies based on social rela-
tions/entitlements transitioning to economies dominated by monetary transactions, 
locally distinct characteristics can be observed in the respective configurations.
While ex-post-observation of differences in agent reasoning is not possible, 
we can still try to make inference about the impact of these differences on the 
time–space-dependent formation of the economic domains. In medieval Japan, for 
example, the authorities were surely not indifferent about monetary affairs. The 
spread and increasing use of coins gave rise to a number of concerns at the begin-
ning of the Japanese Middle Ages (from 1185), but the government swiftly acknowl-
edged it as a new trend, accepting cash payments as contributions from fiefdoms as 
early as 1226 (Segal 2011: 29).
Fiscal affairs, in turn, remained an ongoing concern to the Japanese authorities 
all through the Middle Ages. This was because the reach of their power into many 
of the country provinces was highly dependent on local leaders. To fund the govern-
ance expenses of these local vassals, central authorities made them manage their 
fiefdom lands in terms of a tax base. In contrast to medieval England where the 
lands themselves were the substrate of the geld tax (Barzel and Kiser 2002: 481), it 
was the landholder who was the direct object of taxation in Japan. This meant that 
the management of social relations retained more weight in the overall structure of 
the economy in Japan (compare Fig. 1). This particular Japanese arrangement also 
caused the emergence of pronounced fiscal problems with the advent and spread 
of credit. When increasing numbers of vassals came to yield to the temptation to 
separate consumption from income by offering their lands as collateral for loans, 
local tax bases shrank with every lot of land seized from defaulting debtors, and 
so did the effective reach of central powers into the provinces. Central authorities 
developed a number of counter-strategies including prohibition of mortgages (§48 
of the 1232 legal text Goseibai shikimoku), but more especially by way of what may 
be called ‘chronopolicies’. These included (a) the requirement for a 20-year term 
between acquisition and the recognition of ownership of land (ibid: §8); and (b) 
recurring decreed reversions of time in the sense of a restitution of earlier ownership 
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up to a defined historical point in time,15 a policy not known to exist in the European 
Middle Ages (Ries 2015). Importantly, central authorities’ opposition to mortgage 
credit was motivated by the fiscal needs of their retainers, thus by their own political 
objectives (restoring the vector of social entitlement). This stands in contrast to the 
moral constraints in the Western experience, where canonical law channeled money 
lending into the largely clandestine activity of usury until the end of the medieval 
period. Japanese authorities were even supportive of consumer (pawn) lending, a 
stance documented from as early as the first half of the fourteenth century (§6 of 
the 1336 Kenmu shikimoku). Overall, then, we can see that the Japanese authorities 
periodically adjusted the time axis backwards for fiscal purposes (through their debt 
cancellation bills), while they fostered the drafting of future income via the channel 
of consumer credit. In contrast, no comparable instrumentalisation of time can be 
observed in medieval economic policy in the West. The objects of economic rea-
soning, and the evaluation of specific activities, obviously differed between the two 
societies.
Similarly, with monetisation progressing rapidly in the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
turies, the volume of goods and the extent of their circulation increased rapidly both 
in Europe (Greif 2006; Pirenne 1925), and in Japan. Notably, late medieval Japan 
not only featured substantial domestic flows of goods (Fujita 1986), but was also 
integrated in overseas exchanges, predominantly with China (Tanno 2014) and—for 
the last half century of that period—with Portuguese traders (Oka 2010). Indica-
tions are that authorities in Japan actively supported the construction of larger—less 
weather-dependent—vessels by levying degressive landing taxes on goods imported 
into medieval Kobe harbour (Fujita 2004).16 In other words, political agents inten-
tionally induced a change in the material configuration of the secondary sector to 
strengthen private infrastructure.
The secondary sectors of Europe and Japan under conditions of advanced moneti-
sation (vector of economic media) featured similar institutional developments with 
guild-like craftsmanship associations helping to “secure property rights from the 
grabbing hand of the state” (Greif 2006). Their origins, though, were somewhat dif-
ferent. While generally guilds in Europe were a city phenomenon, many Japanese za 
(lit. ‘seats’) came into existence when rural craftsmen sought market access through 
the protection of temples and shrines (Toyoda 1982). Patronage included safe routes 
to the centres of consumption, and access to outlets within those centres.
Assessing the developments under the vector of economic media against the eco-
nomic structure in Fig.  1 illustrates, in summary, that trade grew in England and 
Japan alike. While this might suffice to (directly) explain the growth of the tertiary 
and (indirectly) of the secondary sector in England,17 it cannot possibly do so in the 
15 Under what was known as tokuseirei medieval Japanese authorities regularly issued orders meant to 
alleviate economic pressures for indebted individuals. These orders typically specified a date after which 
any debt incurred was declared cancelled.
16 The harbour was administered by the Tôdaiji temple organization.
17 By 1600, overseas trade effectively enabled England, but not Japan, to substitute secondary activities 
for primary ones.
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case of Japan. This is because the transition toward a monetised economy brought 
about a much more substantial reduction in economic activities linked to the man-
agement of social relations in Japan relative to England.
What was it that over-compensated for the loss of economic activity linked to the 
management of social relations in the tertiary sector of the Japanese economy? We 
may pursue two lines of inquiry: the microscopic and the macroscopic. The latter, 
being more conducive to the aim of our analysis, is the line taken here. The PSF 
shows us that historic formations of one symbolic form cannot be studied in isola-
tion; we have to account for the entanglements (sometimes conflicted, sometimes 
mutually enhancing, mostly a mixture of both) between different domains. Explor-
ing the entanglements between the religious and the economic realms (the symbolic 
form of myth in Cassirer’s reading) in the European and Japanese Middle Ages aids 
our understanding of their differences. To illustrate the power of this analytical 
approach, we focus on the understanding and handling of time by economic actors, 
linking it back to our initial observation of differences in sectoral structures.
We posit that the religious realm was decisive in informing the understanding 
and handling of time in both geographies during the Middle Ages. Contrasting the 
fundamental stances toward time found in medieval Christianity and Buddhism 
is admittedly a bold argument, but it will prove instrumental for bringing about a 
working hypothesis due to further inquiry. The former (broadly: Christianity) rel-
egated the change under the auspices of heavenly foresight by contesting attempts at 
changing a status quo (Godin 2015). In contrast, Buddhism regarded life as a mani-
festation of impermanence (skt. anitya, jap. mujō). Salvation was ultimately a matter 
of self-transformation, even if later schools of thought (such as those dominant in 
Japan) often allowed for help by intermediary figures. Buddhism also looked favour-
ably upon trade, numbered great merchants among its early supporters, and tolerated 
money lending (Sharma 1983). The latter is instrumental as it is the pre-condition 
for separating expenditure from income in the absence of savings.
In the primary sector, we cannot identify material differences. We have already 
indicated that stockpiling and crop diversification were the dominant attempts to 
‘linearise time’ (in the sense of overcoming seasonality), and both were equally 
present in the West and in Japan. However, when it comes to innovation as pur-
poseful change, differences begin to emerge. While we have found, in the example 
mentioned above, a religious authority actively involved in fostering technological 
advances in civil naval transport in Japan, it has often been said that in late medieval 
Europe, “innovation and heresy were practically synonyms” (Preus 1972: 2). More 
recent scholarship supports this view: “innovations unsupported by tradition or 
Scripture were on the whole seen as corrosive of Christianity” (Illiffe 2000), which 
meant that “innovation only got de-contested in the last century” (Godin 2015). One 
of the few exceptions was the wave of innovation in metallurgy and mining brought 
about by war and the need to finance it (Benoit 1984: 324‒325), but it was only from 
the late fourteenth century when cities slowly became emancipated from the reli-
gious sphere, that more significant developments emerged when they started to grant 
local patents (Long 1991). This was indeed a chronopolitical policy (in the sense of 
regulating time) as it granted inventors a time-limited monopoly.
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The differences between Japan and England in the handling of time for economic 
purposes are even more pronounced in economic reasoning. As we have seen, prices 
remained conspicuously stable in Japan until the very end of its medieval period. In 
terms of time, price stability is either random (and unlikely to continue for centu-
ries), or it is proof of a deliberate decision not to interfere with the monetary base. 
An intention of this kind would amount to a measure to moderate the impact of time 
in a monetising economy.
We can be more confident about the evidence for active handling of time in two 
other policy areas of medieval Japan: fiscal policy and regulation of financial mar-
kets. In fiscal policy, we have already documented regular decrees that set time back 
to an earlier state with the aim of stabilising fiscal revenues, evidence of a strong 
link between the economic and political realms. As regards the regulation of finan-
cial markets, consumer credit was deliberately fostered in Japan at a time when this 
kind of capitalising on future income was generally unacceptable to all but ostra-
cised groups in Europe. For Japan, the impact of a religion that took a benevolent 
view of trade, and accepted change as an essential ingredient of secular life, has thus 
clearly left its footprint on the economic domain.
In summary, we may tentatively note that the medieval economies of England, 
continental Europe, and Japan differed most visibly in their approaches to time under 
the vector of economic media. While our hypothesis pertaining to stockpiling as a 
way of overcoming seasonality applies equally to both economies, all other instances 
of reasoning with and controlling of time only apply to Japan. Taking the different 
sectoral structures of the economies into account (see Fig.  1), we may aggregate 
the hypotheses pertaining to innovation in trade technology, stability of prices (over 
time), and the fostering of credit into a tentative partial explanation how the tertiary 
sector over-compensated the loss of activities linked to ‘social entitlement manage-
ment’. In essence, the particular formation of the economy in the late Japanese medi-
eval period meant that the treatment of time as an economic resource—often identi-
fied as a specific trait of modern market economies—was accepted and practiced 
earlier, and on a broader scale, than in any European economy. The constellation 
between the locally specific historic formations of the religious, the political, and 
the economic symbolic forms thus had a decisive influence on differential economic 
outcomes in the two economies discussed here.
5  What the theory of symbolic forms can contribute to economics
5.1  Theoretical implications
We have seen that the empirical variety in outcomes observed between the medi-
eval economies of England and Japan is a result of (1) differences in the configura-
tions of rules and their functions, and of (2) the constellations between the symbolic 
form of the economy and other symbolic forms, specifically that of religion (“myth” 
in Cassirer’s terminology). While the first difference necessitates another form of 
economic reasoning and activity (namely the brokering and maintenance of social 
1 3
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 
entitlements), the second difference guides the choice of patterns of cognition—as 
documented in our analysis of the handling of time.
Neither symbolic forms, nor their rule–function complexes, can be observed 
and comprehended as such. They can only be explored by scrutinising their various 
instantiations in path-dependently evolved configurations and constellations (which 
one may equally refer to as ‘historic formations’). This prerequisite has important 
theoretical implications for economics. Most importantly, it implies that the econ-
omy as a symbolic form is not a time-transcendent integration of ahistoric cognitive 
models or ideal types. Instead, it is always engendered ex ante in time/space-depend-
ent paradigms and cultural objects. Significantly, this also implies that economic 
reasoning in the received sense of homo oeconomicus represents but one time- and 
space-specific actualisation. To render this argument less abstract, we briefly reiter-
ate the definitional elements of a symbolic form:
1. A normative concept orienting the ensemble of rules guiding the operations 
that produce cultural objects, both physical and intangible.
2.  The lifeworld resulting from these recurring operations and their results, 
including its specific symbols/artefacts.
3. The world of domain-specific imagination/ideas.
4. The set of social practices and associated agent groups.
Interaction between different symbolic forms is present in all of these elements, 
albeit with varying mutual impact. Examples include the idea of ‘white knights’ in 
corporate finance and the link with medieval European mythology, or the interac-
tions between modern mathematics and economics. However, it becomes perhaps 
most tangible via the fourth element. This is because individual agents may be 
members of several groups associated with different symbolic forms. For example, 
an accountant may be involved with a professional organization, and be an active 
member of their local parish; or, conversely, a medieval Japanese monk could be 
in charge of the financial operations of his monastery. The set of rules an agent 
retains and uses for operations will be informed by these associations  (Blind and 
Pyka 2014: 1088–89). For instance, the accountant in our example might, as a result 
of religious beliefs, apply specific professional standards, such as declining certain 
types of mandates. On a larger scale, a polity with strong links to a particular reli-
gion or ideology might foster or restrict certain activities and ways of economic 
thinking. Theorizing the economy as a symbolic form requires an understanding of 
its time- and space-specific configurations, and this includes the constellations rela-
tive to other symbolic forms. In short, economic theorizing needs to reflect the plu-
rality of reason as it is engendered in the various symbolic forms and their historic 
formations.
5.2  Analytical consequences
Contemporary philosophical thought in Cassirer’s tradition is critical of the empiri-
cally led sciences, including much of the discipline of economics: “As reason may 
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never be equaled to cause, the routes of substantiation linking cognitive phenomena 
may never be entirely described in terms of causality” (Kreis 2010: 14). By add-
ing—or rather bringing back—cognition to economics, PSF offers a way of closing 
this gap. Any analysis of outcomes must, by implication, be based on an inquiry into 
the particular ‘patterns of understanding’ involved.
These ‘patterns of understanding’ refer to cognitive acts in the form of operations 
guided by a particular normative orientation (noted above as the first definitional 
element of a symbolic form) arising through condition‒action statements which we 
can conceive as rules. Incidentally, this analytical device is increasingly pertinent 
in heterodox economic analysis (e.g., empirically in Ostrom 1990, and theoretically 
in Dopfer and Potts 2008). Put succinctly and more generally: “A rule is defined 
as the idea that organizes actions and resources into operations” (Dopfer and Potts 
2008: 6). When conceiving of ‘acts of cognition’ as operations (see Blind 2017: 29, 
88), the concept of rule equally enables the analysis of thought, including, impor-
tantly, economic thought (for example, ‘When prices rise, think of it as a monetary 
problem’).
Entanglements between social groups and individual agents’ cross-associations 
with groups pertaining to different symbolic forms mean that a reasoned inquiry 
of relevant rules will frequently involve investigations into matters beyond the core 
areas of economics. In our case study, we have considered political history and reli-
gious studies, but ethnography, technology studies, and even arts and natural sci-
ences may be among the disciplines that need to be drawn upon.
5.3  Empirical practice
While an investigation of cause ultimately necessitates an inquiry into the founda-
tions of reason as formed by the individual set of rules an agent retains, there may 
be several points of departure for studies of the economy as a symbolic form. The 
choice of analytical pathway will depend on disciplinary preferences, but available 
routes can be characterised by the involvement of the definitional elements of a sym-
bolic form (Kreis 2010: 449; rephrased above). In concrete terms, abstract top-level 
concepts (definitional element 3) may be gleaned from documents exposing general 
principles for the sake of guidance or legitimation. We did so in our case study by 
examination of contemporary legal texts. Next, artefacts (e.g., presents exchanged) 
documenting the lifeworld related to a symbolic form (element 2) can be accessed 
for qualitative inquiry, and institutions as social practices (element 4a) can be stud-
ied in historical or sociological terms. In our case study, we only briefly touched on 
such practices when discussing the brokering and maintenance of relations in a sys-
tem of social entitlement. The findings, however, that further study would produce, 
can then systematically be organized by sector and dominant vector, which finally 
enables inferences about the specific rules applied (element 1). It is only then, that 
we can fully understand what one may refer to as the core of received economics: 
the operations of creating and transmitting artefacts (tangible objects, i.e., of goods 
and services in a fully monetized economy).
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Similarly, the evolution of the structure of the economy as a symbolic form per se 
cannot be directly observed, but must be inferred from comparison between historic 
formations over time. These historical (meta-stable) formations may be analyzed via 
their sets of governing rules and the ways these are represented and distributed in 
an agent population (i.e., shares of agents following a specific form of rationality) 
by way of artefacts, institutions, and established forms of interaction. The empiri-
cal methodology for the study of change in rule systems outlined in Blind and Pyka 
(2014) builds on a population concept to track the structural dynamics, and may be 
extended to inquire into both configurations within and constellations between sym-
bolic forms.
In a nutshell, the economy as a symbolic form is intelligible through its top-level 
concept and is directly observable via its lifeworld, artifacts originating from physi-
cal operations and social practices. However, inferences are critically required about 
its constituent rules and its entanglement with other symbolic forms (that are rarely 
directly observable) to establish the link between reasoning and (economic) opera-
tions. Its development over time—which we have sketched in our case study by a 
rough comparison of three points in time—may more minutely be traced through a 
population approach that refers to particular agent groups (definitional element 4).
We concede that changes to practices of social scientists “are not following” 
(Bagg 2017) for the vast majority of social science studies exploring phenomena 
observed within well-researched and given ‘historical formations’. However, we 
hold that practical consequences are a reality in cases of less well-researched for-
mations (e.g., the study of “15 small-scale societies” discussed in Gintis 2004), or 
when studying the transformation of ‘historical formations’ as sketched in our brief 
case study. In these latter cases, the requirements set out here and in the preceding 
paragraphs imply a substantial increase in the workload of inquiry into the economy 
as a symbolic form relative to received approaches. To this is added the particular 
challenge arising from the limited availability of data suitable for an analysis of rea-
son. This is because the overwhelming share of available data focuses on economic 
operations and outcomes.
6  Conclusion
How can we corroborate our claim that E. Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms 
PSF may contribute to economics inquiries?—in his commentary on Cassirer’s PSF 
Kreis notes: “Philosophical argument remains almost as is even if the empirical base 
in individual sciences changes substantially” (2010: 12). We hold that this fully 
applies to PSF when extended into our sketch of the economy as a symbolic form, 
and as subsequently applied to our case study.
While applicability to an evolving empirical base is indeed the characteristic that 
one would demand from any theory, received economic theory often fails to pass 
this test, or passes but with substantial limitations to its epistemological potential. At 
the heart of this limitation, we identify the “convenient” (Robbins 1932: 98) axioma-
tisation of one particular configuration of economic reason. Epitomised in received 
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homo oeconomicus, even the latest advances into bounded, or limited, rationality 
cannot fully remedy the theoretical flaws caused by this indulging in convenience.
Building on Cassirer’s PSF, we have outlined a corresponding sketch of the 
economy as a symbolic form. We have then showcased an application to economic 
outcomes observed in the medieval economies of England and Japan along their 
development from dominance of the vector of social entitlements to that of eco-
nomic media (chiefly: money). Contrasting legal with social/political obligations, 
we were able to formulate a hypothesis for the difference in sectoral structure of 
these economies: the management and brokerage of social relations may explain the 
greater share of the tertiary sector in the medieval Japanese economy. Drawing on 
the entanglement between the symbolic forms of the economy and the religious, we 
further illustrated how differences in the cognitive apprehension of time between 
the medieval formations of religion in England and Japan have suggested alternative 
approaches to its instrumentalisation (i.e., the handling of time) as one of the key 
parameters of economic operations. In concrete terms, an understanding of time as 
a variable accessible to policy measures had important impacts on the development 
of credit markets, fiscal, and innovation policies in Japan. Eventually, most of these 
developments were only to happen much later in Europe, because instrumentalising 
time remained ‘off limits’ for most of the period analyzed here. We trust that our 
brief case study of how agent reasoning is informed by symbolic forms serves to 
corroborate the potential epistemological gains of the approach suggested.
Implications of conceiving the economy as a symbolic form include the need to 
allow for variety in agents’ economic reasoning. Arguably, this relinquishing of the 
conveniently held assumption of universal economic rationality may pose a chal-
lenge to economic theorizing concerned with under-researched historical forma-
tions, and or with transformation processes—from one to another formation. The 
entanglement with aspects beyond the disciplinary boundaries of economics further 
implies that empirical practice in economics at times will need to actively embrace 
multidisciplinary approaches. While this is likely to cause a substantial increase in 
workload, we believe that such effort is warranted. This is because we trust that the 
analytical approach implied by the definitional elements of a symbolic form can be 
comprehensive, coherent, and stands the test of a changing empirical base. It is com-
prehensive, because relevant variables are less likely to be missed with the interdis-
ciplinary scope of inquiry via lifeworlds and artefacts. It can be coherent, because 
it allows establishing intelligible connections between agents, rules, and operations 
as they bring forth artefacts, concepts, and institutions that constitute specific life-
worlds. And finally, as our comparative analysis of the transition from a dominance 
of the vector of social entitlements to that of economic media shows, it stands the 
test of a changing empirical base.
Acknowledgements This research was conducted with support from the European Research Council 
under the Horizon 2020 Programme (ERC Grant agreement no. 741166). The authors gratefully acknowl-
edge thoughtful comments and criticisms from Jan Steiner, Kurt Dopfer, Alexander Steineck, and Kohei 
Kataoka, as well as from two anonymous, but dedicated reviewers. On behalf of all authors, the corre-
sponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.
Funding Open access funding provided by University of Zurich. 
1 3
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
Adolphson M, Mark Ramseyer J (2009) The competitive enforcement of property rights in medieval 
Japan: the role of temples and monasteries. J Econ Behav Organ 71(3):660–668
Allen RC (2001) The great divergence in European wages and prices from the middle ages to the first 
world war. Explor Econ Hist 38:441–447
Aristotle, Forster ESOeconomica. Oxford, Clarendon Press
Barzel Y, Kiser E (2002) Taxation and voting rights in medieval England and France. Ration Soc 
14(4):473–507
Bassino JP, Broadberry SN, Fukao K, Gupta B, Takashima M (2015) Japan and the great divergence 
725–1874. CEPR Working Paper 10569
Bellah RN (1999) Max Weber and world-denying love: a look a the historical sociology of religion. J Am 
Acad Relig 67(2):277–330
Benoit P (1984) Technology and crisis: the great depression of the middle ages and the technology of the 
renaissance. Hist Technol 1(3–4):319–334
Blind G (2017) The entrepreneur in rule-based economics. Springer Nature, Cham
Blind GD, Pyka A (2014) The rule approach in evolutionary economics: a methodological template for 
empirical research. J Evol Econ 24(5):1085–1105
Broadberry S, Campbell B, Klein A, Overton M, Leeuwen B van (2011) British economic growth, 1270–
1870: an output-based approach. University of Kent School of Economics Working Papers 1203
Broadberry S, Campbell BMS, Klein A, Overton M, van Leeuwen B (2015) British economic growth 
1270–1870. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Butler B, Purchase S (2004) Personal networking in Russian Post Soviet life. Res Pract Human Resour 
Manag 12(1):34–60
Cassirer, Ernst. 1923–1929[1953–57]. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 3 volumes.
Cassirer E (1923–1929) Die Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag. 3 
volumes
Cassirer E (1927) Das Symbolproblem und seine Stellung im System der Philosophie. Z Ästhet Allg 
Kunstwiss 21:295–322
Cassirer E (1979) Symbol, myth, and culture: essays and lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935–1945. Yale 
University Press, New Haven
Cassirer E (1985) Form Und Technik. In: Orth EW, Krois JM, Werle JM (ed) Symbol, Technik, Sprache: 
Aufsätze Aus Den Jahren 1927–1933, 39–89. Hamburg: Meiner
Cassirer E (1990) Substanzbegriff Und Funktionsbegriff : Untersuchungen Über Die Grundfragen Der 
Erkenntniskritik. 6. Aufl. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftl. Buchges
Cassirer E (1992) An Essay on Man: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Human Culture. Reprint. New 
Haven: Yale University Press
Cassirer E (1998) The philosophy of symbolic forms. In: Krois JM, Verene DP. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, London
Cassirer E (2004) Vom Wesen Und Werden Des Naturrechts. In: Becker R (ed) Aufsätze Und Kleine 
Schriften (1932–1935). Meiner, Hamburg, pp 203–227
Cassirer E (2005) Axel Hägerström; eine Studie zur schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart; Thorilds 
Stellung in der Geistesgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. In: Rosenkranz C (ed). Vol. Band 
21. Gesammelte Werke/Ernst Cassirer. Hamburg: Meiner
 Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
1 3
Clark G (2015) Markets and economic growth: the grain market of medieval England. Cliometrica 9(3)
Coyle D (2005) The outlaws of medieval England. Hohunu 3:57–59
Domoto H (2016) “Kin’yū Ga Kataru Nihonshi - ‘Ei’nin No Tokuseirei’ Kara Miru Nihonshi [Japanese 
history as told by Finance: The Ei’nin Debt Cancellation Order].” Tōkyō Jōhō Daigaku Kenkyū 
Ronshū [Tokyo University of Information Sciences Working Paper Series] 19 (2): 33–36
Dopfer K (2011) Economics in a cultural key: complexity and evolution revisited. In: Davis JB, Hands 
DW (eds) The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology. Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK, 
pp 319–340
Dopfer K, Potts J (2008) The general theory of economic evolution. Routledge, London
Farris WW (2006) Japan’s medieval population: famine, fertility, and warfare in a transformative age. 
University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu
Fujita H (1986) Ryūtsū Shisutemu Kara Mita Chūsei Nōson Ni Okeru Ichiba No Kinō [The function 
of rural markets in medieval Japan from the viewpoint of logistics]. Jinbun Chiri [Human Geogr] 
38:316–334
Fujita H (2004) Hyôgo kitaseki nyûsen nôchô ni mieru sekisen o meguru kôsatsu [An examination of 
the Tax in the record retained at the customhouse of the port of North Hyogo in 1445]. National 
Museum of Japanese History. Research report Nr. 113, pp. 89–109. Available at: https ://www.
rekih aku.ac.jp/outli ne/publi catio n/ronbu n/ronbu n5/pdf/11300 5.pdf. Retrieved 9 Sep 2020
Fuller JE, Grandjean BD (2001) Economy and religion in the Neolithic Revolution: material surplus 
and the proto-religious ethic. Cross Cult Res 35(4):370–399
Gintis H (2004) Towards the unity of the human behavioral sciences. Polit Philos Econ 3(1):37–57
Godin B (2015) Innovation contested. Routledge, New York
Gowdy J, Marshall S (ed) (1998) The original affluent society. In Limited wants, unlimited means: a 
reader on hunter-gatherer economics and the environment. Island Press
Greif A (2006) Institutions and the path to the modern economy: lessons from medieval trade. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York
Gudeman S (1986) Economics as culture: models and metaphors of livelihood. Routledge, London
Haley JO (2010) Rivers and rice: what lawyers and legal historians should know about medieval 
Japan. J Jpn Stud 36(2):313–349
Hartman LM (1977) Economics as science and as culture. Am J Agr Econ 59(5):925–930
Heinrichs J (2007) Handlungen: das periodische System der Handlungsarten. Orig.-Ausg., 2., Vollst. 
überarb. Aufl. Vol. Teil 1. Philosophische Semiotik/Johannes Heinrichs. München: Steno
Hutton G (2016) Inflation and society. Routledge, London
Illiffe R (2000) The masculine birth of time: temporal frameworks of early modern natural philoso-
phy. Br J Hist Sci 33(4):427–453
Katzner DW (2002) What are the questions. J Post Keynes Econ 25(1):51–68
Kauṭilya, Meyer JJ (1977) Das altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben: das Arthaçāstra des 
Kauţilya. [Nachdruck]. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt
Klattenhoff T (2016) Zur Universalität des Tauschmittels. Wie sich Geld als symbolische Form verste-
hen lässt. In: Endres T, Favuzzi P, Klattenhoff T (eds) Philosophie der Kultur- und Wissensfor-
men – Ernst Cassirer neu lesen. Frankfurt: Peter Lang; pp. 113–136
Klattenhoff T (2018) Geld, eine symbolische form: Perspektiven mit Ernst Cassirer und Georg Sim-
mel. Königshausen&Neumann, Würzburg
Kreis G (2010) Cassirer Und Die Formen Des Geistes. Berlin: suhrkamp
Ledeneva AC (1998) Russia’s economy of favours: blat, networking and informal exchange. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge
Long PO (1991) Invention, authorship, ‘intellectual property’ and the origin of patents: notes toward a 
conceptual history. Technol Cult 32:846–884
Luft S (2004) A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and 
Cassirer. New Yearb Phenomenol Phenomenol Philos 4:209–248
McCloskey D, Nash J (1984) Corn at interest: the extent and cost of grain storage in medieval Eng-
land. Am Econ Rev 74:174–187
Miklautz E (2005) Die Produktwelt als symbolische Form. In Alltagsdinge. Erkundungen der materi-
ellen Kultur 1: 43–62. Tübinger Kulturwissenschaftliche Gespräche. Tübingen: Tübinger Ver-
einigung für Volkskunde
Mueller DC (2004) Models of man: neoclassical, behavioural, and evolutionary. Polit Philos Econ 
3(1):59–76
1 3
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 
Naismith R (2014) The social significance of monetization in the early Middle Ages. Past Present 
223(1):3–39
Oka M (2010) Shōnin to Senkyōshi - Nanban Bōeki No Sekai [Merchants and missionaries: The world 
of early foreign trade]. Tokyo University Press, Tōkyō
Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Ostrom E, Basurto X (2011) Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change. J Inst Econ 
7(3):317–343
Pirenne H (1925) Medieval cities. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Pomeranz K (2000) The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making of the modern world econ-
omy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J
Preus JS (1972) Theological legitimation for innovation in the Middle Ages. Viator 3:1–26
Quinn M (2016) Jeremy Bentham, ‘The psychology of economic man’, and behavioural economics. 
Œcon Hist Methodol Philos 6(1):3–32
Ries G (2015) Umgehung Und Missbrauch Des Erlasses von Schulden – Ein Diachronischer Vergleich. 
In Coester-Waltjen D, Lipp V, Waters DWM (eds) Liber Amicorum Makoto Arai. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos
Robbins L (1932) The nature and significance of economic science. Philos Econ Anthol 1:73–99
Sakurai E (2008) Currency and credit in medieval Japan. Int J Asian Stud 5(1):53–70
Samuel B (2017) When will a Darwinian approach be useful for the study of society. Polit Philos Econ 
16(3):259–281
Say J-B (1803) Traité d’économie politique. Deterville, Paris
Segal EI (2011) Coins, trade, and the state: economic growth in early medieval Japan. Vol. 334. Harvard 
East Asian Monographs. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center
Sen A (1981) Ingredients of famine analysis: availability and entitlements. Q J Econ 96(3):433–464
Sharma RS (1983) Material culture and social formations in ancient India. MacMillan, Delhi
Smith A (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press
Stanfield JR (1995) Economics, power, and culture: essays in the development of radical institutionalism. 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Steineck RC (2014) Kritik Der Symbolischen Formen I. Philosophie Interkulturell, Band 3. Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog
Steineck RC (2017) Kritik der symbolischen Formen II: zur Konfiguration altjapanischer Mythologien. 
Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog
Steineck RC (2020) Kritik der Kultur. Überlegungen zu Cassirers konzept der symbolischen form. Z Kul-
turphilos 14(1):137–152
Tanno I (2014) Nihon No Ajia Kōeki No Rekishi Josetsu [History of Japan’s Trade with Asia]. Kokusai 
Kei’ei Ronshū [Working Papers in Intl. Business] 48: 1–51
Throsby D (2001) Economics and culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Totman C (2000) A history of Japan. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA
Toyoda T (1982) Za no kenkyū [Researching the guilds]. Vol. 1. of collected works. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan
Veblen T (1899) The theory of the leisure class: an economic study of institutions. Macmillan, New York
von Bertalanffy L (1950) An outline of general system theory. Br J Philos Sci 1(2):134–165
von Glasersfeld E (1989) Facts and the self from a constructivist point of view. Poetics 18(4–5):435–448
Yagi K (1993) Carl Menger’s Grundsatze in the Making. Hist Polit Econ 25(4):697–724
Yasuda M (1965) Nihon no hōkenseido no seiritsu ni kan suru kenykūshi [The development of the Japa-
nese insurance system: a research review] Gakushū’in Shigaku [Gakushu’in University History Bul-
letin] 1: 16–36
Yokoyama K (2011) Kamakura, Muramachi-ki Nihon no Kahei keizai [Japan’s monetary economy dur-
ing the Kamakura and Muromachi Eras]. Oikonomika 47(3/4):25–41
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
